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Abstract
This paper reconsiders the security offered by 2-key triple DES, an en-
cryption technique that remains widely used despite recently being de-
standardised by NIST. A generalisation of the 1990 van Oorschot-Wiener
attack is described, constituting the first advance in cryptanalysis of 2-key
triple DES since 1990. We give further attack enhancements that together
imply that the widely used estimate that 2-key triple DES provides 80 bits
of security can no longer be regarded as conservative; the widely stated as-
sertion that the scheme is secure as long as the key is changed regularly is
also challenged. The main conclusion is that, whilst not completely broken,
the margin of safety for 2-key triple DES is slim, and efforts to replace it,
at least with its 3-key variant, should be pursued with some urgency.
1 Introduction
Despite the fact that it has long since been regarded as purely of historical
interest by many cryptographers, triple DES remains of considerable practi-
cal importance, particularly in the payments industry. This is true of both
its widely discussed variants, i.e. 2-key and 3-key triple DES.
In late 2015, NIST finally withdrew support for 2-key triple DES, something
that had long been trailed and that does not appear to have occurred because
of any new insights into the security of the scheme. However, this withdrawal
of support does not mean that the world has stopped using this variant, and
it also remains an ISO/IEC standard (albeit with ISO/IEC having published
warnings regarding the limited level of security that it provides).
As discussed in the next section, the security of 2-key triple DES has always
been regarded as only giving a small margin of safety. In this paper we show
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that this margin is even less than was previously thought. We do this in
three main ways:
• we show how the well-known van Oorschot-Wiener attack can be gen-
eralised to allow its effectiveness to be considerably improved by ex-
ploiting ciphertext generated using multiple keys;
• building on the previous insight we show how the DES complementa-
tion property can be used to gain a factor of two efficiency improve-
ment;
• we demonstrate how partially known plaintext/ciphertext pairs can be
used in the attack as well as fully known pairs, without significantly
damaging the attack’s computational or storage complexity.
We also briefly discuss possible practical approaches to the implementation
of attacks against 2-key triple DES, as well as considering the impact of the
generalised attack on the security of the ANSI retail MAC.
As a result we conclude that the widely held assessment that 2-key triple
DES only offers 80 bits of security is by no means an overly conservative
assumption. It also follows that some of the most significant advice given
to users of 2-key triple DES in order to help avoid cryptanalytic attacks is
of limited validity.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we briefly
review the history of triple DES. This is followed in section 3 by a discussion
of a generalisation of the van Oorschot-Wiener attack, which for the last 25
years has been the most effective known attack against 2-key triple DES. In
section 4 we then show how the DES complementation property can be used
to double the attack speed. We turn in section 5 to considering how partially
known plaintext/ciphertext pairs can be used in the attack. We briefly re-
view possible practical attack implementation strategies in section 6, before
discussing the use of the attack method against the ANSI retail MAC in
section 7. The paper concludes in section 8.
2 Triple DES — a brief history
The DES block cipher was originally published as a US Federal Standard
(NBS FIPS PUB 46 [25]) as long ago as 1977 — for further details of its
origins see, for example, chapter 7 of Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone
[17]. DES, also known as the Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA), is a 64-
bit block cipher, i.e. it transforms a 64-bit plaintext block into a 64-bit
ciphertext block, employing a 56-bit key.
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From the moment it was published it was criticised for the short length
of its key. Even 40 years ago, performing 256 encryption operations, as
necessary to perform a brute force search for the key using a single known
plaintext/ciphertext pair, was just about within the bounds of possibility
using special-purpose hardware. Indeed, the design for a special purpose
brute-force DES-breaking machine capable of finding a DES key within a
day was sketched by Diffie and Hellman, [5], and was estimated by them to
cost 10 million US dollars.
These concerns did not stop the very widespread adoption of DES, not only
within the US (where it became an ANSI standard, X3.92 [2]), but world-
wide, particularly within the financial sector. This was probably because
of the lack of any widely known public competitor schemes. Despite the
short key length, the use of DES was arguably a huge success and there
are no public domain examples, of which the author is aware, of significant
compromises because of the limited key length.
However, it became clear within a few years of its publication that a more
secure version of DES was required, allowing a longer key length. This need
gave rise to the two well-known versions of triple DES, one of which forms
the main focus of this paper. With the rise of triple DES, use of just one
iteration of DES, as originally standardised, became known as single DES.
The gradual switch to triple DES was supported by its standardisation by
NIST [20, 22], ANSI [3], and ISO/IEC [10, 11]. This switch was very timely,
as by the second half of the 1990s single DES has been broken in various
ways (all using brute force attacks). Of particular interest was the fact that
in 1998 a special-purpose DES breaking machine, Deep Crack, was designed
and built for a few hundreds of thousands of US dollars [6], vindicating the
1977 predictions by Diffie and Hellman. In fact, a large distributed software-
only attack (coordinated through the DESCHALL project) had shortly be-
fore succeeded in breaking a ‘DES challenge’ [4]. This served notice to the
world at large that single DES was no longer secure.
Since double DES (i.e. two iterations of DES encryption using independent
keys) has long been ruled out as offering very limited additional security by
comparison with single DES (see Diffie and Hellman, [5]), then the obvious
next alternative is to perform triple DES, i.e. three iterations of the DES
algorithm. The general idea of using three iterations of DES was mentioned
in 1977 by Diffie and Hellman, [5], as a way of dramatically improving
the security of DES. In practice, rather than performing three consecutive
encryptions, it has become the norm to first perform an encryption (using
key K1), then perform a decryption (using key K2), and finally perform
another encryption (using key K3). The encrypt-decrypt-encrypt approach
has the advantage of being backwards-compatible with single DES if K1 =
K2 = K3. This potentially makes migration from single to triple DES much
3
simpler. If K1, K2 and K3 are all chosen independently, encrypt-decrypt-
encrypt is known as 3-key triple DES.
As reported by Merkle and Hellman, [18], in 1978 Tuchman proposed a 2-key
variant of triple DES. This involves choosing K1 = K3, i.e. first encrypting
with K1, then decrypting with K2, and finally re-encrypting with K1. This
approach has the advantage of only involving two DES keys, reducing the key
storage and transmission requirements to the same as for double DES, but
giving significantly greater security than provided by double DES. However,
it is clear that 2-key triple DES is itself significantly less secure than 3-key
triple DES, and Merkle and Hellman [18] described an attack against 2-
key triple DES which is significantly more effective than the best known
attack against the 3-key version. They suggested that this means that the
3-key variant should always be used. Since Merkle and Hellman’s attack
was published in 1981, one other attack against 2-key triple DES has been
devised, namely that due to van Oorschot and Wiener, [27]; this latter attack
is discussed in section 3 below.
The NIST standard for the DES algorithm, FIPS PUB 46-3 [20], was with-
drawn back in 1999. This signalled the end of standard-status for single
DES. The situation for 2-key and 3-key triple DES standardisation is much
less clear cut. Triple DES has been standardised by a variety of bodies in-
cluding NIST in SP 800-67, [22], and by ISO/IEC in the first and second
editions of ISO/IEC 18033-3, [10, 11]. All these standards specify both 2-key
and 3-key triple DES.
Despite the fact that 2-key triple DES is clearly less secure than the 3-
key version, it has been very widely used, particularly by the electronics
payments industry, where it remains in active use. For example, the current
version of the EMV standard, [7], used as the basis for security for credit and
debit cards worldwide, specifies that ‘The double-length key triple DES en-
cipherment algorithm (see ISO/IEC 18033-3) is the approved cryptographic
algorithm to be used in the encipherment and MAC mechanisms’ [here dou-
ble length is a reference to the 2-key variant of triple DES].
As a result, there is considerable industry pressure to retain both variants
as standards. At the same time, there has been considerable pressure both
from academia and from bodies such as NIST to phase out all use of DES
(and in particular 2-key triple DES) in favour of more modern, more secure,
and more efficient algorithms, such as AES, [21].
In this latter connection, for some years NIST has been particularly keen to
phase out triple DES, particularly the 2-key variant. Indeed, in the latest
revision of NIST SP 800-131A, [23], published in late 2015, it was announced
that support for 2-key triple DES had been withdrawn. A similar statement
can be found in the latest (January 2016) version of NIST SP 800-57 Part
1, [24]. This withdrawal of support is in line with previous announcements
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on the subject. However, ISO/IEC has not followed the same path, and
both 2-key and 3-key triple DES variants remain as standard algorithms in
the most recent (2010) version of ISO/IEC 18033-3 [11], although use of the
3-key variant is recommended. ISO/IEC SC 27 (the committee responsible
for drawing up ISO/IEC 18033-3) has published guidance on the use of
triple DES in two standing documents, [12, 13]. Key statements from one of
these standing documents, [12], expressing sentiments that have been widely
reproduced elsewhere, are:
• ‘depending on the required security level, the maximum number of
plaintexts encrypted under a single key should be limited’; and
• ‘the effective key-length of two-key Triple-DES in specific applications
can only be regarded as 80 bits (instead of 112 bits)’.
The statement regarding 80-bit security has also been given in various doc-
uments produced by NIST (see, for example, Section 5.6.1 of NIST 800-57
Part 1, [24]). We reconsider both these claims at the end of this paper.
3 Generalising the van Oorschot-Wiener attack
3.1 The original attack
In 1990, almost a decade after the Merkle-Hellman attack was published, a
somewhat more practical attack against 2-key triple DES was described by
van Oorschot and Wiener [27]. This attack is more practical than Merkle-
Hellman in that it only requires known plaintext/ciphertext pairs, rather
than chosen plaintext/ciphertext pairs. We next provide a brief description
of this attack.
The attack requires that the attacker has access to n plaintext/ciphertext
pairs (P , C), all created using the same 2-key triple DES key (i.e. the same
pair of DES keys (K1, K2) — we use this notation throughout). The main
idea behind the attack is to fix a 64-bit value A, and to hope that eK1(P ) = A
for one of the known pairs (P , C). If this is true, then finding K2 only
requires a single DES key search, i.e. performing 256 DES operations. Of
course, unless n is very large, the guess is unlikely to be true, so the attack
has to be performed for many values of A. The larger the value of n, then
the larger the probability of a successful guess of a value A, and hence the
more efficient the attack.
The attack proceeds as follows, where eK(P ) and dK(C) represent the DES-
encryption of P , and DES-decryption of C, respectively, using the key K.
1. Tabulate the (P , C) pairs, sorted or hashed on the plaintext values P ,
to create Table 1, which requires O(n) words of storage.
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2. Now randomly select and fix (for steps 2–4) a value A. [This stage of
the attack will succeed if and only if A = eK1(P ) for one of the known
plaintexts P . If steps 2-4 succeed with this value of A we can find the
target triple DES key; if not, we simply repeat with a different value
of A — see step 5.]
3. Create a second table (Table 2) as follows. For each of the 256 possible
DES keys i, calculate Pi = di(A). Next look up Pi in Table 1. If Pi is
found in the first column of Table 1, take the corresponding ciphertext
value C and compute B = di(C). Now store B together with i in Table
2, which is sorted (or hashed) on the B values. Note that the same B
value may occur more than once.
4. Each entry in Table 2 consists of a value of B and the corresponding
key i, where i is a candidate for K1; as described above, each (B, i)
pair is associated with a (P , C) pair from Table 1 where ei(P ) = A.
The remaining task is to search for possible values of K2.
For each of the 256 candidates, j, for K2, calculate what the value B
would be if j had been used for K2, i.e. Bj = dj(A). Now look up Bj
in Table 2. For each appearance of Bj (if any) the corresponding key
i from Table 2, along with key j, is a candidate for the desired pair of
keys (K1, K2). Each such candidate key pair is then tested on at most
two other plaintext/ciphertext pairs. If this key pair gives the correct
results then the target triple DES key (K1, K2) has been found and
the task is complete.
5. If the algorithm does not succeed, then the process in steps 2–4 is
repeated for a new random value of A. [Note that, to avoid the (small)
risk of repeating values of A, the values could be worked through in
some order].
We can summarise the complexity of this attack as follows.
• The time required to create and sort/hash Table 1 is negligible com-
pared to other computations given n << 256. As already mentioned
the space required is O(n).
• For each trial value A, Table 2 costs a little more than 256 DES compu-
tations to create (assuming Table 1 is hashed on the plaintext values
so that look-ups take a constant time). Because only 256 out of 264
possible 64-bit blocks are searched for in Table 1, the expected number
of entries in Table 1 is n/28, i.e. the storage required for Table 2 is
negligible by comparison with Table 1.
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• Working with Table 2 to find candidate pairs of keys costs a further
256 DES computations. That is, testing a single value of A costs a
total of around 257 DES computations.
• The probability that a single iteration of steps 2–4 will succeed, i.e.
yield the correct key pair, is approximately n/264, and hence the total
cost of the attack is approximately 2121/n DES computations (assum-
ing the cost of the various look-ups and tests is dwarfed by the DES
calculations).
In summary, if we have 2t known plaintext/ciphertext pairs, i.e. n = 2t,
then 2-key triple DES can be broken using 2121−t DES computations and
O(2t) storage. For example, if n = 232, i.e. if we have as many as 4 billion
known plaintext/ciphertext pairs, then the key can be discovered in 289 DES
computations.
The conclusion from the above attack is that launching a practical attack
only becomes practical if very large volumes of matching plaintext and ci-
phertext, all generated using a single triple DES key, are available. This has
led to the following two widely drawn conclusions regarding the security of
2-key triple DES, referred to at the end of section 2.
• As a conservative estimate, 2-key triple DES offers at least 80 bits of
security.
• As long as the key is changed reasonably frequently (limiting n in
the above attack), practical attacks against 2-key triple DES remain
infeasible.
In the remainder of this paper we challenge the second conclusion, and also
provide evidence that the lower bound estimate of 80 bits of security is not
as conservative as it might seem.
3.2 The generalisation
We start by making an apparently simple observation on the van Oorschot-
Wiener attack. That is, the attack will work just as well if the n plain-
text/ciphertext pairs are generated using a range of different triple DES
keys. Of course, when performing the tests in step 5, it is necessary to use
additional plaintext/ciphertext pairs that have been generated using the
appropriate triple DES key. Also, when the attack is successful, only one
of the keys will be found, and can only be used to decrypt other material
encrypted using that key. Nevertheless, depending on the application, this
could still have devastating consequences for security.
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We can modify the algorithm described above to take account of this obser-
vation by changing steps 1, 3 and 4, as follows.
1′ Assemble the pairs (P , C) into subsets1, where all the pairs in each
subset have been created using the same key, and assign each subset
a unique label s (we also use s as the label for the triple DES key
used to create the subset). Tabulate all the (P , C, s) triples (where
s is the key label), sorted or hashed on the plaintext values, to create
Table 1, which requires O(n) words of storage. Note that there may be
repeated P values, but this should not create a major implementation
difficulty.
3′ Create a second table (Table 2) as follows. For each of the 256 possible
DES keys i, calculate Pi = di(A). Next look up Pi in Table 1. If Pi is
found in the first column of Table 1, take the corresponding ciphertext
value (or values) C (and the label(s) s) and for each compute B =
di(C). Now store B together with i and s in Table 2, which is sorted
(or hashed) on the B values. Note that the same B value may occur
more than once.
4′ Each entry in Table 2 consists of a value of B and the corresponding
key i and label s, where i is a candidate for K1 for label s; as described
above, each (B, i, s) triple is associated with a (P , C, s) triple from
Table 1 where ei(P ) = A. The remaining task is to search for possible
values for K2.
For each of the 256 candidates, j, for K2, calculate what the value B
would be if j had been used for K2, i.e. Bj = dj(A). Now look up Bj
in Table 2. For each appearance of Bj (if any) the corresponding key
i from Table 2, along with key j, is a candidate for the desired pair
of keys (K1, K2) with label s. Each such candidate key pair is then
tested on at most two other plaintext/ciphertext pairs from the label
s subset. If this key pair gives the correct results then the triple DES
key (K1, K2) with label s has been found and the task is complete.
Apart from the fact that the tables have an additional value in each entry
(namely the key label, which might typically be at most four bytes long),
none of the attack complexities have changed. I.e., if we have 2t known
plaintext/ciphertext pairs, i.e. n = 2t, then 2-key triple DES can be broken
using 2121−t DES computations and O(2t) storage. Here the meaning of
‘broken’ is slightly different from previously, in that it means that one of
the triple DES keys has been discovered, rather than the single key used to
encrypt the entire set of n pairs.
1We require that each subset contains at least two, and preferably three, pairs, so that
candidates for (K1, K2) can be checked.
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It is important to see that this means that changing the triple DES key
from time to time has no impact on the effectiveness of the attack. Of
course, regular key changes remain a good idea since, even if the above
attack is successful, only the plaintext encrypted using the broken key can
be recovered. Finally, we observe that there is nothing specific to DES
about the above generalisation, or the original van Oorschot-Wiener attack
for that matter. The attack would work equally well against any triple-
iterated block cipher with the same key structure; however, we restrict our
attention to DES here since it is the only block cipher for which triple
encryption is widely used (at least as far as is known to the author). Also,
the enhancement described in the next section is specific to DES.
4 Exploiting the DES complementation property
We next see how the effectiveness of the generalised van Oorschot-Wiener
attack can be improved using the well-known DES complementation prop-
erty (see, for example, [17]). This property says that, for any 64-bit block
P and any DES key K ( where X denotes the bit-wise complement of bit
string X):
eK(P ) = eK(P ).
That is, if P and K are complemented, then the output ciphertext is also
complemented. It is interesting to observe that Lucks [16] considered how
to use this property to improve the efficiency of his attacks on 3-key triple
DES.
This property can be used to double the number of plaintext/ciphertext
pairs available to conduct the attack, since every plaintext/ciphertext pair
for the keyK will give us another pair for the keyK. Another way of looking
at this is that we can perform the attack steps for A and A simultaneously.
We can incorporate this observation into the generalised attack of section 3
by modifying steps 3′ and 4′ as follows.
3′′ Create a second table (Table 2) as follows. For each of the 256 possible
DES keys i, calculate Pi = di(A). Next look up both Pi and Pi in
Table 1.
• If Pi is found in the first column of Table 1, take the corresponding
ciphertext value (or values) C (and the label(s) s) and for each
compute B = di(C). Now store B together with i, s and a one-
bit complementation flag F (in this case set to zero) in Table 2,
which is sorted (or hashed) on the B values.
• Similarly, if Pi is found in the first column of Table 1, take the
corresponding ciphertext value (or values) C (and the label(s) s
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and flag F = 1 to indicate a complemented value) and for each
compute B = di(C). Now store B together with i, s and F in
Table 2, which is sorted (or hashed) on the B values.
Note that the same B value may occur more than once. Note also
that, instead of introducing the flag F , we could choose to implement
Table 2 in two parts, one containing the entries with F = 0 and the
other the entries with F = 1. Such an approach might simplify the
implementation of step 4′′.
4′′ Each entry in Table 2 consists of a value of B and the corresponding
key i, label s and flag F , where i is a candidate for K1 for label s; as
described above, each (B, i, s) triple is associated with a (P , C, s)
triple from Table 1 where ei(P ) = A if F = 0 and ei(P ) = A if F = 1.
The remaining task is to search for the desired value of K2. For each
of the 256 candidates, j, for K2, calculate what the value B would be
if j had been used for K2, i.e. Bj = dj(A) (note also that Bj = dj(A)).
Now look up Bj and Bj in Table 2.
• For each appearance of Bj with F = 0 (if any) the corresponding
key i from Table 2, along with key j, is a candidate for the desired
pair of keys (K1, K2) with label s. Each such candidate key pair
is then tested on at most two other plaintext/ciphertext pairs
from the label s subset. If this key pair gives the correct results
then the triple DES key (K1, K2) with label s has been found
and the task is complete.
• Similarly, for each appearance of Bj with F = 1 (if any) the cor-
responding key i from Table 2, along with key j, is a candidate
for the desired pair of keys (K1, K2) with label s. Each such
candidate key pair is then tested on at most two other plain-
text/ciphertext pairs from the label s subset. If this key pair
gives the correct results then the triple DES key (K1, K2) with
label s has been found and the task is complete.
Since, in effect, two values of A are being tested at once, the above modifi-
cation should halve the number of times the process needs to be performed.
At the same time, Table 2 will contain twice as many entries, but since Table
2 is small by comparison with Table 1, this should not significantly affect
the overall storage complexity.
Hence, if we have 2t known plaintext/ciphertext pairs, i.e. n = 2t, then
2-key triple DES can be broken using 2120−t DES computations and O(2t)
storage. For example, if n = 232, i.e. if we have as many as 4 billion known
plaintext/ciphertext pairs, then the key can be discovered in 288 DES com-
putations.
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5 Using partially known plaintext
The next modification to the attack that we describe is designed to cope
with the situation where we have ciphertext blocks for which we do not
know the precise plaintext value. For example, we may have a ciphertext
block C for which we know 56 of the 64 plaintext bits, but not the other
eight, i.e. there is a set of 28 possible values for P for a given ciphertext
block C. The van Oorschot-Wiener attack (and the variants we have so far
described) cannot use such information, rather restricting the scenarios in
which the attack will work.
Such a situation could easily arise in practice. To take a simple example
from the payments industry (where 2-key triple DES is in use), the ISO
9564-1 [9] Format 0 PIN block involves creating a 64-bit plaintext block
by combining an account number with a 4-digit PIN [9]. If a triple-DES-
enciphered Format 0 PIN block is obtained for which the account number
is known, then the only unknown information in the plaintext is the value
of the PIN, for which there are only 104 ≈ 213 possible values.
Such partial plaintext information can be used in a further modification to
the van Oorschot-Wiener attack. This modification arises from the observa-
tion that the attack will still work even if some of the plaintext/ciphertext
pairs are actually false. If a false pair generates a candidate key, then this
key will be rejected when it is checked against ‘correct’ pairs. Of course,
there is the danger that the check at the end of step 4 might be done using a
false pair, and hence a valid candidate would be rejected, but we can avoid
this if we assume checking is always done using valid data.
This observation can be used to make use of partial knowledge of a plain-
text block (for a known ciphertext block) by generating a set of plain-
text/ciphertext pairs all having the same ciphertext element. That is, we
generate all the plaintext blocks P which satisfy the known information,
and for each such ‘possible’ plaintext block we create a pair containing it
and the known ciphertext block. We then add them all to the set of known
plaintext/ciphertext pairs used in the attack. For example, if we have a ci-
phertext block C for which we know all but w bits of the plaintext block, we
then generate 2w plaintext/ciphertext pairs with plaintext blocks covering
all possibilities for the ‘missing’ w bits, all with the same value of C. Of
course, all but one of these pairs will be false, but this does not matter.
To see how this affects the attack, we give below a modified version of the
generalised attack technique given in section 3.2 — only steps 1 and 4 are
changed, and hence we only show these steps. Whilst we could readily
combine this modification with the attack exploiting the complementation
property, in order to simplify the presentation we avoid doing this here.
We suppose that we start with n ciphertext values, for some of which we
11
know the correct plaintext and for others we only have partial information.
We assume that in every case there are at most 2w candidates for the plain-
text block, i.e. the set of mostly false pairs for a single ciphertext block
contains at most 2w pairs.
1′′′ Assemble the pairs (P , C) into subsets including the sets of mostly false
pairs (as above), where all the pairs in each subset have been created
using the same key, and assign each subset a label s. Note that there
will be at most 2wn pairs. Tabulate all the (P , C, s) triples, sorted
or hashed on the plaintext values, to create Table 1, which requires
2wO(n) words of storage. Note that there may be repeated P values,
but this should not create a major implementation difficulty.
4′′′ Each entry in Table 2 consists of a value of B and the corresponding
key i and label s, where i is a candidate for K1 for label s; as described
above, each (B, i, s) triple is associated with a (P , C, s) triple from
Table 1 where ei(P ) = A. The remaining task is to search for possible
values for K2.
For each of the 256 candidates, j, for K2, calculate what the value B
would be if j had been used for K2, i.e. Bj = dj(A). Now look up Bj
in Table 2. For each appearance of Bj (if any) the corresponding key
i from Table 2, along with key j, is a candidate for the desired pair
of keys (K1, K2) with label s. Each such candidate key pair is then
tested on at most two other plaintext/ciphertext pairs from the label s
subset (where either the mostly false pairs are avoided, or where only
the partial information about the plaintext is used in the checking).
If this key pair gives the correct results then the triple DES key (K1,
K2) with label s has been found and the task is complete.
It remains for us to consider the complexity of this modified attack.
• Table 1 will contain at most 2wn entries. The time required to create
and sort/hash Table 1 remains negligible compared to other computa-
tions as long as n << 256−w. The space required is 2wO(n).
• For each trial value A, Table 2 costs a little more than 256 DES compu-
tations to create (assuming Table 1 is hashed on the plaintext values
so that look-ups take a constant time). Because only 256 out of 264
possible 64-bit blocks are searched for in Table 1, the expected number
of entries in Table 1 is 2w−8n, i.e. the storage required for Table 2 is
negligible by comparison with Table 1.
• Working with Table 2 to find candidate pairs of keys costs a further
256 DES computations. That is, testing a single value of A costs a
total of around 257 DES computations.
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• The probability of a single iteration of steps 2–4 succeeding, i.e. yield-
ing the correct key pair, is approximately n/264, and hence the total
cost of the attack is approximately 2121/n DES computations (assum-
ing the cost of the various look-ups and tests is dwarfed by the DES
calculations).
In summary, if we have 2t partially known plaintext/ciphertext pairs, i.e.
n = 2t, and we assume n << 256−w, then 2-key triple DES can be bro-
ken using 2121−t DES computations and O(2t+w) storage. For example, if
n = 232, i.e. if we have as many as 4 billion known (or partially known)
plaintext/ciphertext pairs, then the key can be discovered in 289 DES com-
putations. That is, the extra work introduced through the use of ‘false’
pairs is minimal as long as n << 256−w, i.e. t + w << 56. Of course, the
cost of storage has increased to O(2t+w), but this is still relatively modest
if t + w << 56. Note that we can reduce the total number of DES com-
putations to 2120−t by combining the above modification with that given in
section 4.
Returning to the PIN block example above (for which w ≈ 13), if n = 232
then the attack complexity would not be significantly different to the case
where 232 fully known plaintext blocks are available.
In summary we have generalised the attack to the case where only par-
tial known plaintext is available, without significantly increasing the attack
complexity. This, while not simplifying the attack, means it will potentially
apply in many more practical scenarios.
6 Implementation strategies
Whilst performing an attack on 2-key triple DES will clearly be a non-trivial
computation, it is perhaps worth considering how it might actually be done
in practice. Note that while we refer to steps 1–5 from the unmodified van
Oorschot attack, the remarks below also apply to all the modified versions
described above.
First note that step 1 is a one-off computation working with the known
plaintext-ciphertext material to create Table 1. This step should be per-
formed carefully to optimise the cost of the look-ups performed using Table
1 in subsequent parts of the attack.
We next observe that there are obvious ways in which the remainder of the
attack can be parallelised.
• Performing steps 2–4 for a particular value of A is completely inde-
pendent of performing them again for a different value of A. All that
is required is access to a copy of Table 1, generated by step 1. That
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is, software could be created which generated random values of A and
performed steps 2–4, and this software could be run without reference
to other running copies of the software — the only requirement is an
effective random number generator so that different instances of the
software generate different values of A (with high probability).
• The creation of Table 2 in Step 3 could be parallelised by partitioning
the set of possible keys i, so that multiple machines together create
Table 2.
• Similarly, the use of Table 2 in step 4 could be partitioned by parti-
tioning the set of possible keys j. Note that each device performing
this part of the attack will require a copy of Table 2. Note also that,
as they are found, ‘candidate’ keys could be sent to a different device
for testing using entries from Table 1.
7 Attacking the ANSI Retail MAC
7.1 Background
As a slight digression we also consider the impact of the van Oorschot-
Wiener attack on the ANSI Retail Message Authentication Code (MAC) [1].
This MAC algorithm appears to be used in the payments industry, since it
is standardised in A1.2.1 of the current version of EMV Book 2 [7]. The
scheme, otherwise known as CBC-MAC-Y or ISO/IEC 9797-1 algorithm 3
[8], operates as follows. For the purposes of this paper we describe it in the
context of use with DES, although the remarks apply more generally. We
also use the same notation as employed previously.
A message D to be MAC-protected is first padded and split into a sequence
of q n-bit blocks: D1,D2, . . . ,Dq. The MAC scheme uses a pair of keys K1,
K2. The MAC computation is as follows.
H1 = eK1(D1),
Hℓ = eK1(Dℓ ⊕Hℓ−1), (2 ≤ ℓ ≤ q), and
M = eK1(dK2(Hq)),
where ⊕ represents bit-wise exclusive or, and M is the MAC. Note that, for
simplicity, we assume that the MAC is not truncated.
It is not hard to see that this amounts to encrypting the message using single
DES in CBC mode, but using 2-key triple DES on the final block; the MAC
M is then simply the encryption of the final block. This suggests that the
van Oorschot-Wiener attack may be relevant (and it is!).
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The most effective general-purpose key recovery attack on the ANSI retail
MAC algorithm requires 257 DES operations and 232 known message/MAC
pairs, as described by Preneel and van Oorschot [26]. An alternative key
recovery attack, requiring only one known MAC/message pair but a larger
number of verifications, is due to Knudsen and Preneel, [15]; this attack
requires 256 DES operations, one known message/MAC pair, and 256 online
MAC verifications. Further key recovery attacks based on MAC verifications
have been devised, [14, 19], although they are more relevant in the case where
the MAC is truncated and so we do not describe them further here.
7.2 Applying the van Oorschot-Wiener attack
First observe that the applicability of the van Oorschot-Wiener attack to the
ANSI retail MAC does not appear to have previously been considered, very
probably because the ‘standard’ Preneel-van Oorschot attack is typically
more effective. As discussed in section 3, the van Oorschot-Wiener attack
requires large volumes of matching plaintext and ciphertext generated using
a single key in order to be effective. Also, as discussed immediately above,
the Preneel-van Oorschot attack, [26], requires 232 known message/MAC
pairs, and if such material is available it is then significantly more efficient
than the van Oorschot-Wiener attack. That is, the van Oorschot-Wiener
attack does not appear to offer any advantage over the established Preneel-
van Oorschot attack.
However, the fact that van Oorschot-Wiener can be made to work where the
known ciphertext has bene generated using multiple keys, suggests that it
may have significance to this MAC scheme. We next sketch how the attack
can be applied in this case. For simplicity we look at the application of the
‘standard’ version of the attack (as described in section 3), although the
generalised versions of sections 3.2 and 4 also apply.
We suppose the attacker has access to nmessage/MAC pairs ((D1,D2, . . . ,Dq),
M), all created using the same pair of DES keys (K1, K2). Note that, for
simplicity, we consider the padded and split version of a message. As before,
we fix a 64-bit value A, and in this case hope that dK1(M) = A for one of
the known pairs ((D1,D2, . . . ,Dq), M). If this is true, then finding K2 only
requires a single DES key search, i.e. performing 256 DES operations. Of
course, unless n is very large, the guess is unlikely to be true, so the attack
has to be performed for many values of A. The larger the value of n, then
the larger the probability of a successful guess of a value A, and hence the
more efficient the attack.
The attack proceeds as follows.
1. Tabulate the ((D1,D2, . . . ,Dq), M) pairs, sorted or hashed on the
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values of M , to create Table 1, which requires O(2rn) words of storage
if we make the simplifying assumption that q is bounded above by 2r.
2. Now randomly select and fix (for steps 2–4) a value A. [This stage of
the attack will succeed if and only if A = dK1(M) for one of the known
values of M . If steps 2–4 succeed with this value of A we can find the
target key pair (K1, K2); if not, we simply repeat with a different
value of A — see step 5.]
3. Create a second table (Table 2) as follows. For each of the 256 possible
DES keys i, calculate Mi = ei(A). Next look up Mi in Table 1. If Mi
is equal to one of the value of M in Table 1, take the corresponding
ciphertext message D1,D2, . . . ,Dq and compute
H1 = eK1(D1),
Hℓ = eK1(Dℓ ⊕Hℓ−1), (2 ≤ ℓ ≤ q), and
B = Hq.
Now store B together with i in Table 2, which is sorted (or hashed)
on the B values. Note that the same B value may occur more than
once.
4. Each entry in Table 2 consists of a value of B and the corresponding
key i, where i is a candidate for K1; as described above, each (B,
i) pair is associated with a ((D1,D2, . . . ,Dq), M) pair from Table 1
where di(M) = A. The remaining task is to search for possible values
of K2.
For each of the 256 candidates, j, for K2, calculate what the value B
would be if j had been used for K2, i.e. Bj = ej(A). Now look up Bj
in Table 2. For each appearance of Bj (if any) the corresponding key
i from Table 2, along with key j, is a candidate for the desired pair
of keys (K1, K2). Each such candidate key pair is then tested on at
most two other message/MAC pairs. If this key pair gives the correct
results then the target DES key pair (K1, K2) has been found and the
task is complete.
5. If the algorithm does not succeed, then the process in steps 2–4 is
repeated for a new value of A.
7.3 Impact on security
The algorithm is, of course, very similar to that given in section 3. As a
result, the complexity considerations are very similar too, with the following
exceptions.
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• Table 1 is now larger, containing a q-block message and a 64-bit MAC.
If, as above, we assume q ≤ 2r for some r, then Table 1 will contain
at most 2r+3n bytes.
• Computing an entry in Table 2 will take up to r+1 DES computations
instead of a single DES computation.
• Checking a candidate key pair will take up to r+2 DES computations.
However, as long as r is not too large, say r ≤ 210 then even if n is as large
as 240, Table 1 will contain at most 253 bytes. Since the number of entries in
Table 2 is much less than in Table 1, and similarly the number of candidate
key pairs is much less than 256, the other two differences do not affect the
overall attack complexity.
Hence, bearing in mind the generalisations to the van Oorschot-Wiener at-
tack described above, if we have 2t known message/MAC pairs, i.e. n = 2t,
and the message length is bounded above by 2r, then the ANSI retail MAC
can be broken using 2120−t DES computations and O(2t+r) storage. For ex-
ample, if n = 232, i.e. if we have as many as 4 billion known message/MAC
pairs, then one of the DES key pairs used can be discovered in 288 DES
computations. The main novel observation here is that the known mes-
sage/MAC pairs do not need to all have been generated using the same pair
of keys.
Hence if, for example, no more than 230 message/MAC pairs are available
generated using a single key, the Preneel-van Oorschot attack will simply
not apply, whereas the attack described above will. That is, limiting the
number of MACs generated using a single pair of DES keys, whilst effective
in mitigating the Preneel-van Oorschot attack, does not protect against the
generalised van Oorschot-Wiener attack.
8 Conclusions — the future of 2-key triple DES
The fact that the van Oorschot-Wiener attack can be used with both plain-
text/ciphertext pairs generated using a multiplicity of keys and with par-
tially known plaintext significantly enlarges the set of scenarios in which
the security of 2-key triple DES is at risk. Whilst obtaining 232 known
plaintext-ciphertext pairs all generated using a single key sounds like a tall
order for an attacker, obtaining the same number of only partially known
plaintext/ciphertext pairs possibly generated using a multiplicity of keys
seems greatly more plausible. This is why we suggest that the estimate
of 80-bit security seems a very realistic estimate, and does not leave much
margin of safety.
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In particular, the advice to change keys regularly does not give the protection
expected. Of course, performing regular key changes is good advice, but does
not reduce the success probability of the attack; it only limits the impact of
a successful attack.
80 bits of security does not seem very much today, given that 56 bits of
security, as provided by single DES, was deemed very risky 30 or more years
ago. It would therefore seem prudent to replace 2-key triple DES as soon
as possible, either with the 3-key variant or with a more modern and more
efficient algorithm like AES. Use of AES also allows the introduction of
256-bit keys, giving protection against possible attacks based on quantum
computing.
As a final remark we also observe that the observations in section 7 also cast
doubt on the future viability of the ANSI retail MAC when used with DES.
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